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Abstract 
The municipal solid waste collection and disposal service is a key element of the European 
strategy aimed at moving towards a circular economy. An efficient municipal solid waste 
collection and disposal is closely related to both lower waste tax and higher welfare of the 
interested population. In Italy, the lack of a centralized regulatory framework has determined 
heterogeneous performances of sector operators across the country. Firstly, we will be 
estimating the productive efficiency in different optimal territorial areas and secondly we will 
be forecasting the economic benefits that would arise under a new regulatory regime. Our 
approach combines the well-known yardstick competition and the price-cap mechanisms. 
Results suggest that if all territorial areas converged to the most efficient ones, a potential 
saving between 12% and 19% emerges, i.e., up to €2bn savings out of €10.05bn total tax 
revenue in 2015. 
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1. Introduction 
The municipal solid waste (MSW) collection and disposal service defines the waste collected 
by or on behalf of municipal authorities and disposed of through waste management systems. 
MSW consists mainly of waste generated by households, although it also includes similar 
waste from sources such as shops, offices and public institutions (Eurostat, 2017). Every local 
government provides a MSW collection and disposal service to its residents and although 
service levels, costs and the environmental impact vary deeply, it is arguably one of the most 
important municipal service (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata, 2012). The MSW collection and 
disposal service has established itself as a pillar in the strategy for a more circular economy 
worldwide (Beccarello and Di Foggia, 2018). It thus follows from this that both the optimal 
territorial areas (OTAs) i.e. the area where integrated public services such as waste collection 
and disposal are organized and the financing system including the waste tax (WT) depend on 
economic and political factors too (Plata-Díaz et al., 2014). One may say that in Italy, the WT 
finances the full cost of the waste collection and disposal service since the proportion of the 
costs of collecting and disposing of MSW covered by WT is 98.9%. In today’s fast-paced 
business environment, waste management (including the collection and disposal service) is 
rapidly evolving towards a complex system of services, including planning, administrative, 
financial, engineering and legal functions. No wonder that it has a central role in 
environmental policies (EC, 2015). In this context, it is important to gain insight into the 
industry costs since they affect citizens via taxes and fees. Although the number of studies on 
the performance of MSW collection and disposal service has increased over the last decade, 
it remains quite distant from the literature of other infrastructure services (Simões and 
Marques, 2012). At the same time, the proper cost accounting has become a critical issue for 
waste disposal companies (Passarini et al., 2011),  as performance measures have become 
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prominent information for administrators, policymakers and regulators (Pérez-López et al., 
2016). The latter shall progressively adopt or update the regulatory framework to maximize 
market efficiency and social well-being. In Italy, this transformation made it necessary to re-
design the MSW management models previously carried out by municipalities. A wide-ranging 
debate has developed at an Italian institutional level on the need to confer regulatory powers 
to a specific sectoral authority. Similarly to the main network services (energy, 
telecommunications, water and transport) it would be necessary to develop a regulatory 
framework able to combine efficiency goals and, at the same time, to ensure greater 
homogeneity and convergence across the different OTAs. An adequate comparison of the 
costs of the service and their determinants represents the knowledge base for promoting an 
well planned service regulation model capable of promoting management efficiency 
throughout the national territory and thus guaranteeing social well-being. The past decade 
has seen the emergence of data on waste production and many studies have recently analyzed 
it; regarding costs, however, there is still little information available needed to better 
understand the empirical relationships important to policy making (Kinnaman, 2009). Our 
purpose is twofold. Firstly, we will be evaluating the level of efficiency achieved by the OTA 
and subsequently we will be estimating the economic benefits deriving from an innovative 
regulatory framework, based on an incentive method that combines the price cap mechanism 
and a parametric mechanism.  
Our results confirm significant cost differences across different OTAs and suggest that if all 
OTAs converged to the most efficient ones the collectivity would save between 12% and 19% 
of current costs. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we will be 
providing a brief overview of the Italian MSW context. Subsequently, the sources and the 
structure of the data will be listed in addition to the model used to estimate the average cost 
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function of the service in order to fuel our analyses. Thereafter, the results of our estimates 
will be shown and through the parameters of cost and efficiency the potential cost savings 
deriving from an incentive regulation model will be assessed through a simulation performed 
over a five-year regulatory period. After discussing the implications of our simulation the 
conclusions will be drawn. 
2. Context  
Although MSW represents only about 10% of the total waste generated in the EU, countries 
which have developed efficient municipal waste collection and disposal services tend to 
perform better in overall waste management (EEA, 2016). EU waste policy and legislation 
occur within the context of a number of wider EU policies and programs and these initiatives 
include the seventh Environment Action Program, the Raw Materials Initiative and the 
Resource Efficiency Roadmap. Nevertheless, efforts to shift up the waste hierarchy have been 
on the go for longer in many countries, driven by earlier EU legislation such as the 1999 Landfill 
Directive. Together, these instruments establish a range of waste management targets and 
broader forward-looking goals (EEA, 2013). In Italy, the most significant advance in the sector 
dates back to the Legislative Decree 22/97, which promoted a model of aggregated 
management between several municipal administrations to improve economies of scale in the 
management of the service and to achieve two important objectives: minimizing the 
movement of waste and achieving self-sufficiency on the part of the municipal administrations 
involved. Self-sufficiency refers to each OTA that, as mentioned, defines the organizational 
perimeter of the waste management service. Nevertheless, the OTAs were designed in a 
deeply heterogeneous way along the country. It follows that, as we will see in the following 
parts of our work, the organizational differences determine dissimilar management efficiency 
standards across Italy. Indeed, in the field of MSW collection and disposal, many small 
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businesses operate in an uncompetitive environment, with the frequent use of an in-house 
provision and an excessive contract length. The fragmentation of rules, often at municipal 
levels, has boosted different business models at local and regional level. Therefore, citizens 
pay different prices to service providers for the same or comparable kinds of services.  
In addition to the two main points that deserve special attention, i.e., the efficiency level and 
a forward-looking regulatory mechanism, it should be noted that in the waste management 
sector competition levels both for the market and in the market are low. In fact, the direct in-
house award of MSW collection and disposal service prevails. Furthermore, a recent survey 
by the Italian Competition Authority reveals the duration of the awards tend to exceed the 
optimal period (AGCM, 2016).  
Many studies have investigated the relationship between ownership form and performance 
(Lombrano, 2009). Indeed, the rising pressure in terms of cost efficiency of public services 
pushes governments to transfer part of those services to the private sector to decrease service 
costs (Jacobsen et al., 2013). Nonetheless, the conclusions on the effects of privatization are 
mixed (Simões et al., 2012).  As far as we know, however, few studies analyze how a healthy 
regulation may affect performance and social well-being in the waste sector. A breakthrough 
in regulatory policy during the last decades has been the awareness that government’s 
objectives for the utility industries can also take benefit from facilitating competition (Arrigo 
and Di Foggia, 2015). In this context, a good regulation can promote competition in certain 
industries by ensuring that market’s power in natural-monopoly segments is not used 
abusively and by providing the correct incentives to business participants (Arnold et al., 2011). 
Among the forms of incentive regulation, the price cap and yardstick competition mechanisms 
emerge. The price cap is a method of regulating the prices of public services aimed at 
constraining the growth rate of prices or tariffs.  On the one hand, an operator with high 
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market power may abuse its dominant position through excessive pricing and on the other 
hand, unregulated firms maximize profits, leading to both deadweight losses and transfers of 
purchasing power from consumers to the firm. Both situations are costly to the regulator. To 
encourage companies to be efficient, the regulator can set a price cap that aims at tackling 
these problems; generally there is  a trade-off between providing incentives and reducing 
excess profits (Cowan, 2002). In this sense, beside the price cap a regulatory agency can 
introduce the well-known concept of yardstick competition to deduce the costs of a firm by 
comparing such costs with those of other players which, although they are not direct 
competitors, operate in the same sector and under comparable market conditions (Shleifer, 
1985). We have developed this idea in the Italian context in an effort to foresee potential 
benefits arising from effective regulation.   
3. Research objective, design & method 
The emergence and evolution of literature on MSW services’ cost and efficiency has been well 
documented and arguably represents one of the most thought-provoking topics in today’s  
increasing international concern about public spending (Simões and Marques, 2012). Scholars 
have proposed many different approaches in an effort to shed light on the cost of the service. 
In general, the production function should consider the relationship between inputs and 
output produced (Berndt, 1991). More in detail, given the output y and some xi inputs with i = 
1,..., n, a production function defines the maximum amount of y depending on the 
combination of xi inputs with i = 1,..., n net of exogenous contextual factors according to the 
level of technology A.  
(1) 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥1, … . , 𝑥𝑛, ; 𝐴)  
Provided that there are various ways to interpret eq. (1), from an economic point of view, 
basic assumptions must complement it, including profit and cost optimization assumptions. 
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Since the level of output y is predetermined (i.e. it is not a contemporaneous endogenous 
variable), prices of the n inputs, p1,….pn are given and any rational operator shall minimize 
production costs, in this respect the relation in eq. (2) complements the production function. 
(2) 𝐶 = 𝑔(𝑝1, … 𝑝𝑛, 𝑦; 𝐴)  
Given that the relationship between inputs and output is not linear, a common approach is 
the Cobb-Douglas (Berndt, 1991). Our analysis stems from this methodology. Performance has 
most often been studied in terms of total cost and its determinants. Indeed, there are many 
ways to depict the functional form of total cost (TC)  function as eq. (3) where Qi represents 
the quantity of MSW and TC is the total cost of collecting and disposing of MSW. The quadratic 
term takes into consideration a non-linear relationship between quantity and both marginal 
and average costs (Bohm et al., 2010). 
(3) ln(𝑇𝐶𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽2(𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖)2 + 𝜇𝑖   
It goes without saying that besides companies’ efficiency and service level, the cost of 
different waste disposal methods depends on the technology adopted and on the country’s 
specific policy measures; for example, incineration costs are twice the costs of landfill (Bianchi, 
2012).  Given that performance, indicators shall be simple and reliable measures for 
monitoring services (Mendes et al., 2013), these indicators could gather many untapped 
potentials and serve stakeholders  in strategic planning (Teixeira et al., 2014). The comparison  
between observed values and the maximal achievable optimal values is a streighforward way. 
We have estimated a frontier of efficiency according to well-known methods. Firstly, we have 
derived the cost function, after that the reference border was constructed. Value estimated 
by our model expresses the cost that the specific OTA would have in the service production if 
it operated according to the average industry standard. We have obtained the efficiency 
boundary by reclassifying the average cost values of OTAs from the most efficient (i.e., with 
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the actual value compared to the lowest estimated value) to the least efficient ones. 
Subsequently, the calculated difference concerning the most efficient value (lower average 
cost) led to a comparative assessment regarding the relative efficiency level (Abbott and 
Cohen, 2009). Our efficiency assessment approach is based on commonly used parametric 
techniques rooted in the seventies (Kumbhakar et al., 2015), that use a standard production 
and cost function methodology. An alternative popular efficiency measurement technique is 
the data envelopment analysisis (Rogge and De Jaeger, 2013). Nevertheless, a potential 
advantage of our approach is that random variables can be accommodated.  In this document 
we do not deal with the breakdown of technical and cost inefficiency; indeed, we focus on an 
operator's overall performance through measures such as the ratio of the potential cost over 
the observed cost  as formalized in eq. (4) for convenience (Bauer, 1990; Fabbri, 1996). 
(4) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑔(𝑝1, … 𝑝𝑛, 𝑦; 𝐴)𝐶𝑖 =  1𝑒𝑢𝑖   
We have assumed that a market regulation mechanism based on the dual combination of 
price cap and yardstick competition approaches would generate a convergence trend towards 
a higher performance in the medium-term. The potential cost saving depends on the 
assumptions made as per the benchmark. We have calculated such saving according to three 
scenarios that differ in the number of operators to include in the top performant cluster and 
in turn the level of efficiency. In the first scenario, our cost-efficiency target comprises only 
operators attaining a performance equal to or greater than the threshold fixed at 75% of the 
top performant operator. In the second scenario, the performance threshold corresponds to 
85% of the top-ranked operator, while in the third scenario such threshold raises to 95% of 
the most efficient. 
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3.1. Data mining on municipalities 
We have collected and organized the data using the panel-data approach to get a meaningful 
estimate both in dynamic and comparative terms (Wooldridge, 2010). After proper data 
cleaning operations, aimed at eliminating the distorted values, we have aggregated the 
municipal information in 83 OTAs. Specifically, starting from the intitial 82 OTAs, we have 
excluded the Aeolian Islands and included three hypothetical OTAs based in the Lombardy 
Region, which instead availed itself of the derogation allowed by Legislative Decree 152/2006. 
The file dataset (strongly balanced) contained 249 total observations clusterd into n = 83 OTA 
over T = 3 periods (2013-2015). Our analyses were based on multiple data sources. The 
detailed data on the quantities of waste collected comes from the MSW cadaster published 
by ISPRA and contains information on the type of waste collection, allowing the classification 
between DW and total MSW. More specifically, MSWind corresponds to the sum of 
undifferentiated MSW, rubbish from street sweeping and other undifferentiated MSW, SDW 
indicates multi-material waste collection, and I identifies bulky waste for disposal. In the same 
way, the variable DW contains the organic fraction, packaging waste, multi-material 
collection, bulky waste for recovery, textiles, selective collection, paints and the like, WEEE 
and others. We can, therefore, define the following: MSW=DW+MSWind+SDW+I. The 
economic and financial information comes from the consultative balance sheet certificates of 
Italian municipalities contained in the AIDA PA database (86.5% of cases) and from primary 
sources such as WT financial plans (4.8% of cases). For the remaining municipalities, we have 
estimated the amount by historical, territorial and dimensional values of the municipalities 
themselves weighted by the average values of the WT available in the literature (Garotta et 
al., 2016). As far as the orographic and morphological characteristics are concerned, we have 
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used the municipal data published by ISTAT. Other information comes from the SPL 
observatory, INVITALIA's ATO monitor.  
3.2. The estimated model 
The WT per ton of MSW represents the variable with which we will evaluate the operational 
efficiency of the different OTAs, with the same service characteristics. We have represented 
the MSW collection and disposal service as a production activity with an environmental 
output.  This activity requires the use of production factors that involve operating costs, the 
coverage of which determines the cost borne by the population. The dependent variable in 
our reference model is UWT, namely  the log of ( WTMSWton)  that stands for WT per ton of MSW. 
The independent variables that represent the main determinants of costs follows. POP and 
KM are  the log of population and Km2 of the OTA respectively. The urbanization index URB  is 
an indicator based on population density and contiguity. TRKM resumes the log of ( TRKm2) or 
the total revenue per km2 of the municipalities belonging to the OTA. PROLAB is the log of (𝑀𝑆𝑊𝑡𝑜𝑛𝐿 ) i.e. a  measure of labor productivity as the ratio between the quantity of treated 
MSW and the staff employed in the MSW collection and disposal service. MWI is the log of (MSWtonKm2 ) that represents the intensity of MSW production, i.e. tons of waste produced per 
square kilometer. Similarly DWI is the log of (DWtonKm2 ) and denotes the tons of differentiated 
waste (DW) produced per squared kilometer. UTA is the log of ( TAMSWton) and indicates the 
balance sheet value of tangible fixed assets per ton of MSW. Furthermore, we employ two 
additional variables in model 3 and model 4, specifically ALT is the average altitude and LAT is 
an ordinal value for latitude tha may take three values: 1 stands for south and islas, 2 
corresponds to the center and 3 I the north of country.  
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Table 1: descriptive statistics of variables 
3.2.1. The model 
The methodology used in this study is a regression-based analysis. The empirical evidence 
about cost drivers is heterogeneous with results and implications that often diverge regarding 
both operational and policy implications. From the premise about data characteristics it is 
possible to define a multiple regression on i = 1;...., N observations in t = 1;...; T.   
(5) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∝ +𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 … . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
The estimation of the determinants of the cost function served to infer on the relative 
efficiency of the managing entities through a parametric approach (Cambini et al., 2016). Since 
we did not have direct observations on the cost structure, quantitative information on the 
main factors of service production was approximated through variables. Production costs are 
influenced by the interaction between different factors, both exogenous such as population, 
the productive and economic structure of a given territory, and endogenous to the 
organizational model of the MSW management service, including technological choices, 
control of companies operating in the sector. Factors which literature identifies as cost drivers 
include: characteristics of the population, characteristics of the territory, characteristics of the 
productive and economic system, characteristics of the MSW, characteristics of 
service(Garotta et al., 2016; Greco et al., 2015; Guerrini et al., 2017; Mincarini, 2017). Starting 
from previous literature and our hyphoteses we estimated the eq. (6). 
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(6) log ( WTMSWton)𝑖𝑡= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 log(𝑃𝑂𝑃)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 log(𝐾𝑀)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 log ( TRKm2)𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5log (𝑀𝑆𝑊𝑡𝑜𝑛𝐿 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 log (MSWtonKm2 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7  (DWtonKm2 )𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽8 log ( TAMSWton)𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
From which  eq. (7) can be carved according to the variable description above provided. 
(7) 𝑈𝑊𝑇 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑃 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑀 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑅𝐵 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐾𝑀+ 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐵 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑊𝐼 +  𝛽7𝐷𝑊𝐼 + 𝛽8𝑈𝑇𝐴+  𝑢 
 
 
4. Results 
There are two main arguments that are worth an explanation: coefficients of our regression 
model and the comparison across OTAs. Model (1) in   
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Table 2 represents the reference model as in eq. (7). Model (2) stems from the same 
regression but using MLE and one may observe that both models contain similar information. 
We added two additional models: Model 3 and Model 4 even if exogenous.  Models 3 and 4 
in table 2 contain two additional independent variables, namely ALT and LAT whose 
coefficients confirm a positive effect of the altitude on cost and that companies based in 
northern Italy show lower costs.   
Table 2: Econometric analysis  
 The recent literature based on an analysis of the Italian context indicates positive economies 
of scale with regards to the total quantity of waste treated, but not regarding the separate 
collection (Greco et al., 2015), which, on the contrary, increase management costs. The results 
of our model go in the same direction and specifically the coefficients of the variables relative 
to the production per km2 of MSW (-0.857***) and to the production per km2 of DW 
(0.0707***) show opposite signs as expected. In fact, while on the one hand the productive 
density of waste contributes to the optimization of the process and represents a positive 
factor for the objective of economies of scale, separate collection requires a more 
sophisticated organization and technological capacity. It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
cost of collecting undifferentiated waste is 45.3% of the cost of separate collection and this 
difference represents the higher costs of separate collection (CONAI, 2013). The variable's 
coefficient representing the value of tangible fixed assets for MSW is negative, as expected (-
0,0307***). The coefficient of the variable constructed as an indicator of labor productivity, 
being the ratio between waste and necessary personnel (-0.0360**), reveals a significant 
inverse relationship between the number of employees per ton of MSW and the WT. It is a 
measure calculated by dividing the output produced by the input that corresponds to the 
personnel employed in the certainly restrictive hypothesis that the hours worked are 
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homogeneous; this variable is influenced both by the organization of the service and by the 
choice of the combination of inputs employed. The two variables concerning the dimension 
of OTAs, i.e., population and surface, show opposite signs: positive in the first case and 
negative in the second. The first of the two, however, could be affected by the presence of 
urban areas (mainly provincial capitals) of medium or large size with higher costs than 
territories composed of small urban centers (Garotta et al., 2016). The degree of urbanization 
is also significant (-0,189**) as the negative sign implies a decrease of WT per ton of MSW in 
OTAs with a higher degree of urbanization. While on the one hand population density can be 
a facilitating factor in economies of scale, on the other hand, it is noted that a higher 
population density can make collection services more expensive (Guerrini et al., 2017) for a 
number of factors including, for instance, greater technological and dimensional constraints 
on the vehicles used and the available time windows. Finally, the model also considers 
economic characteristics through a variable representing the total revenue per Km2 of the 
municipalities belonging to the OTA (0,173***), as it is correlated with the waste complexity. 
The coefficients listed above are functional to the estimation of the hypothetical cost (WT per 
ton of MSW) given the factors considered and represented by the variables in Table 1. The 
estimated costs are useful both in defining the model and in assessing the efficiency of OTAs. 
In fact, these values allow the assessment of the ideal financial needs necessary to run the 
waste collection and disposal service i. e. how much this would cost in the different OTAs. 
Considering the comparison of the OTAs performance, Table 3 summarizes the main results 
by classifying them according to efficiency levels. The first column contains the list of OTAs 
under analysis. The second column shows the average costs in euros per ton (€/ton) of MSW, 
while the third column shows the predicted €/ton. The fourth column illustrates the 
measurement of the efficiency of each OTA compared to the one that was most efficient. The 
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fifth column indicates the efficiency levels (of the fourth column) in terms of €/ton. Each value 
can represent the cost delta of the  OTA with respect to the most efficient. The sixth column 
shows the maximum potential savings of the specific OTA if it performed as the most efficient 
OTA.  
Table 3: comparable information  
Considering the result in terms of average incremental cost one may note that:  11 OTAs 
(13.25%) show a level of inefficiency leading to an increase in the average €/ton of MSW 
between 0 and 50.32 OTAs (38.55%) with an inefficiency level leading to an average cost of 
MSW between 50 and 100; 31 OTAs (37.35%) have a level of inefficiency with an average €/ton 
of MSW between 100 and 150;8 OTAs (9.64%) have a level of inefficiency with an average 
value between 150 and 200 €/ton of MSW; and finally, in an OTA with an average cost of 200 
€/ton of MSW higher than the benchmark.  Table 2 also shows significant potential savings for 
citizens. The average cost reduction was €33.5m, with a maximum value of €376.37m and a 
minimum value of €0.45m. This empirical evidence suggests that there is significant potential 
for improvement which could be pursued through a centralized regulation model with 
incentive mechanisms.  
5. Discussion, implications and proposal  
We are aware that our analysis deals with problems of asymmetry on the specific cost 
structure of the regulated operators; however, through the introduction of an independent 
and centralized market regulation system it is possible to overcome these difficulties for 
consumers’ benefit. Our results concur to bridge the information gap that is amplified in a 
sector characterized by few big utilities and a multitude of small and medium-sized enterprises 
both private and state-owned or controlled. The OTAs shall be functional to the creation of an 
efficient service and competition. The widespread regulation model should be replaced by a 
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centralised regulatory model to overcome the prominent asymmetric information that 
characterizes this sector. We will develop this idea in more detail in the following section. 
Regulatory agencies can achieve both efficiency and convergence of performance goals 
through a well-designed dynamic market regulation mechanism. We propose an approach 
that combines the well-known price cap method (Rudnick and Donoso, 2000; Taylor and 
Weisman, 1996), already provided for by law 481/95, and a parametric method provided for 
by the literature on yardstick competition (Shleifer, 1985). Eq. (8) analytically represents the 
key elements of the price cap mechanism.  
(8) 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡−1(1 + (𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡−1 − 𝑋))  
The price pt periodically updates within a regulatory period considering the price of the 
previous year pt-1. This occurs through an index that considers both the consumer price index 
at time t-1, i.e. CPIt-1, and the factor X, namely the rate of change in productivity required by 
companies (Xt-1 - Xt) in the period considered (Shleifer, 1985). It follows that pt≤CPI-X. Based 
on the formula, market operators may annually re-evaluate the price. In order to increase the 
price at time t, operators shall improve productivity. However, the price cap mechanism 
requires all operators to target the same level of dynamic efficiency.  Therefore, it does not 
guarantee a dynamic cost convergence and it does not promote mergers or acquisitions (de 
Vries and Verhagen, 2014). However, social equity requires that effective regulation of the 
sector be able to promote a homogeneous service burden nationwide for homogeneous 
services. The yardstick competition aims at providing incentives for regulated operators to 
rationalize costs  (Fried et al., 2008; Rudnick and Donoso, 2000; Shleifer, 1985). The 
mechanism foresees rewards of each operator as a function of competitors’ standards and its 
own performance (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). In an industry the n firms face the demand curve 
Q(P) and an operator investing z on cost-reduction achieve unit cost level c(z), with c(0) is c0 
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and the lump-sum transfer to the operator is T (in case of lump-sum transfer existence). Under 
the mentioned condition profit π is derived in Eq. (9). 
(9) 𝜋 = [𝑃 − 𝑐(𝑧)]𝑄(𝑃) − 𝑧 + 𝑇  
Nevertheless, the function c(z) is unknown and this approach allows to replace the cost of 
individual operators with the industry average taking to the profit relation as in eq. (10). 
(10) 𝜋 = [𝑐?̅? − 𝑐(𝑧)]𝑄(𝑐𝑖̅̅̅̅ ) − 𝑧𝑖 + 𝑧?̅?  
To simulate the effect we have introduced three assumptions valid for the first regulatory 
period: the number of options available i.e. option A and option B, the productivity factor X 
and the length of the regulatory period. In option A, the maximum prices that operators may 
apply link to standard costs with reference to a benchmark, while in option B the maximum 
prices that operators will be able to apply stem from historical costs and indexed using the 
price cap mechanism, for example by setting X=5%. The assumptions above take effect over a 
five-year regulatory period. The operators shall choose the option  at the beginning of the 
regulatory period. Each year within the regulatory period, the two options determine a 
mechanism of self-selection: the most efficient operators opt for option A, while the least 
efficient ones go for option B. It is assumed, although not contemplated in this paper, that 
once the first regulatory period ends, the regulator shall update all the parametres, in order 
to set new goals. Indeed, in the second period the general efficiency level would be higher 
because of the improvement prompted by the first. Therefore, in the medium term this dual 
option approach will boost efficiency until all operators select the first option. Of course, the 
regulation of the service quality must complement the price regulation.  
In order to support our statements, we have analyzed the implications of three scenarios of 
our proposal for sector regulation. As previously introduced in the first scenario, our cost-
efficiency target comprises only OTAs attaining a performance equal or greater than the 
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threshold fixed at 75% of the top performant one. In the second scenario, the performance 
threshold corresponds to 85%, while in the third scenario, the most demanding, the target 
comprises those OTAs that perform at least at the 95% of the most efficienct one. This allows 
us to estimate the economic effects of the proposal in the three scenarios assuming a 5% 
coefficient of productivity recovery X, net of inflation for a 5-year regulatory period. Table 4 
shows the potential savings estimated in the three scenarios.  We base our estimates starting 
from the national WT revenue in 2015 i.e. about €10.05bn. The first section of Table 4 presents 
the potential savings under the first scenario. In the regulatory period of 5 years, total savings 
amounted to €1.21bn.  Moreover, the number of OTAs that would opt in this period for the 
adoption of a price cap tariff update tend to decrease from 50 in the first period to 11 in the 
fifth period: this by virtue of both the increase in efficiency year after year and the marginal 
difference of OTAs' performance compared to the established threshold. Instead, the number 
of OTAs that find it more convenient to adopt the parametric method increase from 33 in the 
first period to 87 in the second period. In the second section of Table 4, we consider a higher 
level of efficiency with the 85% threshold. In this case, the estimated savings increase to 
€1.68bn over the five years. The OTAs that in this case would opt for the price cap mechanism 
go from 70 in the first period to 29 in the fifth period. In the third section of Table 4, we still 
increase the level of efficiency by setting the threshold to 95%. The potential savings over the 
regulatory period reached €1.96bn.  The number of OTAs that would opt for the price cap 
regulatory mechanism go from 79 in the first period to 56 at the end of the first regulatory 
period. 
Table 4: potential savings 
Our simulation confirms the expected results of the proposed regulatory mechanism. In the 
three scenarios, we have considered the progressive increase in the number of OTAs that each 
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year opt for the parametric method. This means that the regulation mechanism favors a 
process of convergence towards the desired goals of the regulator.  However, in determining 
the level of parametric efficiency, the regulator must consider the different technological 
capacities across OTAs and the related plant costs. If operators are conditioned (also for 
contractual reasons with local authorities) by rigid technology, the regulator will be able to 
use a less binding benchmark by replicating the mechanism for a second regulatory period to 
obtain greater convergence over a wider period. Alternatively, the regulator of the next 
regulatory period could re-estimate the cost parameters and update the efficiency levels to 
the new sector average and so forth until a satisfactory level is achieved with the resulting 
positive externalities. To complete our analysis, we have highlighted the potential savings if 
all regulated operators performed at the level of the most efficient ones chosen in the three 
scenarios. If all operators operated at the level of efficiency equal to that of the first scenario, 
savings would reach €2.053bn. If all OTAs were operating at the level of efficiency equal to 
that of the second scenario, savings would reach €2.337bn, whereas if all OTAs were operating 
at an efficiency level equal to that of the third scenario, savings would add up to €2.616bn. 
6. Conclusion 
Given the waste collection and disposal service’s performance heterogeneity, the need to 
understand the determinants of such differences is more timely than ever for making people 
better off.  An efficient service is also a core pillar in moving towards a circular economy. 
Firstly, we have assessed the costs of collection and disposal of MSW and considered some 
determinants of the cost structure. We then have analyzed the level of efficiency of the sector 
and verified the differences in performance across different OTAs. Data confirms that the 
efficiency level diverges significantly. Building on that we have highlighted a potential cost 
saving achievable through an innovative regulation. We have proposed a regulatory 
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mechanism based on the use of the parametric method known as yardstick competition and 
price cap mechanism. Our approach fosters a process of convergence towards the predefined 
and desirable efficiency levels. The results of our simulation have shown a potential saving 
between 12% and 19% as compared with the current figure. We have obtained accurate 
results demonstrating that the efficiency differential among best and worst cases is 
unsustainable in the long term. The findings might be representative of a typical situation of 
service delivery. Moreover, it shall be noted that the considered WT is charged to citizens, 
although regarding the assimilation of industrial waste to urban waste one of the main issues 
is that the WT is also charged to the system of business activities, even if in some cases the 
service is not provided and the related costs are not borne. This could have a significant impact 
on the average cost of collection and disposal service. In view of the fact that the European 
Commission has adopted an ambitious plan to make the transition to a stronger and more 
circular economy this paper has serious policy implications. A more efficienct MSW collection 
and disposal service would help to create the confidence required to justify the investment 
needed to capacity building that is a social, environmental and economic priority. Future 
studies on the current topic, espectially in a internationally comparable manner, are therefore 
suggested in order to pave the way for a faster transition towards a circular economy. 
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Annex 1 
Annex 1: Additional descriptive statistics 
Variable 
 
Mean Std, Dev, Min Max Observations 
UWT overall 5.801 0.174 5.378 6.345 N =     249 
between 
 
0.160 5.482 6.310 n =      83 
within 
 
0.068 5.446 6.214 T =       3 
POP overall 13.028 0.912 11.367 15.535 N =     249 
between 
 
0.916 11.372 15.532 n =      83 
within 
 
0.003 13.019 13.036 T =       3 
KM2 overall 7.742 0.951 5.102 10.089 N =     249 
between 
 
0.955 5.102 10.089 n =      83 
within 
 
0.00 7.742 7.742 T =       3 
URB overall 1.661 0.484 1.00 3 N =     249 
between 
 
0.486 1.00 3 n =      83 
within 
 
0.00 1.661 1.661 T =       3 
TRKM2 overall 12.564 0.930 11.069 16.939 N =     249 
between 
 
0.925 11.298 16.516 n =      83 
within 
 
0.126 12.016 12.987 T =       3 
PROLAB overall 13.673 1.254 11.622 17.998 N =     249 
between 
 
1.214 11.747 17.728 n =      83 
within 
 
0.331 12.457 15.434 T =       3 
MWI overall 4.489257 0.976 2.971 7.897 N =     249 
between 
 
0.979 2.984 7.887 n =      83 
within 
 
0.034 4.263 4.725 T =     3 
28 
 
Variable 
 
Mean Std, Dev, Min Max Observations 
DSI Overall 3.3480 1.305 0.402 6.727 N =     249 
Between  1.305 0.592 6.665 n =      83 
within  0.120 2.959 3.840 T =     3 
Source: own elaboration 
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Table 1: descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
UWT 249 5.801 0.174 5.378 6.345 
POP 249 13.028 0.912 11.367 15.535 
KM 249 7.742 0.951 5.102 10.090 
URB 249 1.661 0.484 1.000 3.000 
TRKM 249 20.306 0.974 18.235 23.091 
PROLAB 249 13.673 1.254 11.622 17.999 
MWI 249 4.489 0.976 2.971 7.897 
DWI 249 3.348 1.305 0.402 6.728 
UTA 249 3.907 1.621 -3.559 7.216 
ALT 249 3.205 1.023 1.000 5.000 
LAT 249 1.843 0.900 1.000 3.000 
Source: own elaboration 
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Table 2: Econometric analysis 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 GLS 
(reference) 
MLE GLS MLE_bis 
VARIABLES UWT UWT UWT UWT 
POP 0.767*** 0.762*** 0.725*** 0.719*** 
 (0.101) (0.103) (0.102) (0.103) 
KM -0.772*** -0.766*** -0.727*** -0.720*** 
 (0.0999) (0.103) (0.101) (0.103) 
URB -0.189** -0.188** -0.243** -0.242** 
 (0.0956) (0.0933) (0.101) (0.0979) 
TRKM 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0258) (0.0270) (0.0268) 
PROLAB -0.0306*** -0.0307*** -0.0316*** -0.0318*** 
 (0.00929) (0.00919) (0.00919) (0.00903) 
MWI -0.857*** -0.851*** -0.830*** -0.823*** 
 (0.0766) (0.0840) (0.0771) (0.0833) 
DWI 0.0707*** 0.0686*** 0.0962*** 0.0937*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0228) (0.0223) (0.0250) 
UTA -0.0307*** -0.0306*** -0.0289*** -0.0289*** 
 (0.00562) (0.00555) (0.00562) (0.00553) 
ALT   0.0286 0.0288 
   (0.0223) (0.0215) 
LAT   -0.0528** -0.0519** 
   (0.0226) (0.0222) 
Constant 4.079*** 4.076*** 4.211*** 4.205*** 
 (0.384) (0.375) (0.414) (0.404) 
     
Observations 249 249 249 249 
Number of id_ato 83 83 83 83 
R2 0.309  0.348  
σ_u 0.128 0.138 0.126 0.135 
σ_ε 0.0511 0.0566 0.051 0.056 
ρ 0.8626 0.858 0.859 0.854 
Source: own elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. R2 
overall. Panel data with random effects (Prob> χ2 = 0.3607)and GLS (Prob>χ2 = 0.5732) 
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Table 3: comparable information 
ATO 
WT/MSWton 
(Observed) 
WT/MSWton 
(predicted) 
Performance 
Additionan € 
per MSWton 
Potential 
€mn 
saving per 
OTA 
Friuli Venezia G 240.93 337.26 100 0.00 0.00 
Vicenza 259.09 356.52 98.77 4.40 1.18 
Isernia 249.82 331.05 95.97 13.33 0.45 
Fermo 260.87 341.64 95.08 16.81 1.34 
Lomb N 253.81 331.03 94.77 17.32 21.79 
Campobasso 1 299.4 375.99 91.81 30.8 1.55 
Verona Nord 252.13 314.75 91.33 27.28 5.46 
MI-BG-BS 289.73 354.51 89.71 36.47 94.9 
Macerata 278.51 331.84 87.51 41.45 6.03 
Verona Sud 273.55 321.40 86.33 43.95 4.57 
Lomb S 258.84 301.96 85.72 43.13 32.4 
Vibo Valentia 310.91 360.77 85.26 53.18 3.33 
Belluno 306.16 354.79 85.15 52.7 4.30 
Catanzaro 314.94 363.00 84.68 55.62 8.65 
P di Trento 303.95 348.06 84.11 55.30 12.48 
Caltanissetta P S 280.85 319.62 83.57 52.51 3.12 
Agrigento P O 303.08 340.5 82.43 59.83 3.15 
Crotone 276.76 307.75 81.51 56.91 4.41 
Salerno 392.91 435.43 81.20 81.85 35.91 
Ancona 292.63 324.81 81.35 60.59 13.92 
Cuneese 281.86 308.07 79.95 61.78 16.44 
Napoli 3 383.77 417.48 79.51 85.53 34.91 
Cosenza 343.20 372.29 79.25 77.25 22.26 
Verona Città 298.60 324.51 79.42 66.78 8.88 
Ascoli Piceno 287.01 307.24 78.02 67.52 7.52 
P Bolzano 311.45 331.99 77.63 74.28 17.74 
Napoli 1 430.37 458.9 77.66 102.54 66.52 
Destra Piave 357.52 378.02 76.86 87.46 17.08 
Valle d'Aosta 254.28 267.53 76.39 63.16 4.58 
Rovigo 277.73 292.09 76.35 69.07 8.49 
Frosinone 354.02 370.33 75.84 89.47 15.84 
NO-VE. BI. V  C 343.39 357.45 75.37 88.03 32.78 
Benevento 441.31 458.53 75.19 113.74 10.58 
Bari 282.00 289.21 73.93 75.40 44.96 
Brenta 340.54 352.91 74.94 88.42 20.72 
Abruzzo 345.64 355.80 74.23 91.46 54.40 
Campobasso 2 401.42 411.60 73.91 107.37 3.39 
Padova Centro 311.40 320.47 74.27 82.46 13.03 
B A T 293.22 299.60 73.57 79.19 14.16 
Reggio Calabria 337.27 343.71 73.31 91.72 21.12 
Catania area M 332.22 336.03 72.57 92.17 34.85 
Rieti 386.50 369.98 66.97 122.19 8.15 
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ATO 
WT/MSWton 
(Observed) 
WT/MSWton 
(predicted) 
Performance 
Additionan € 
per MSWton 
Potential 
€mn 
saving per 
OTA 
Pesaro e Urbino 263.69 261.31 70.53 77.02 16.74 
sinistra Piave 395.02 390.37 70.25 116.15 12.20 
Basilicata 390.52 384.05 69.75 116.16 23.08 
Latina 300.61 294.66 69.42 90.11 26.96 
Viterbo 329.98 323.58 69.46 98.82 13.12 
Astigiano e Ales. 376.64 368.02 69.09 113.74 32.54 
Torinese 371.50 358.60 67.84 115.33 119.82 
Messina area M 375.86 361.06 67.34 117.92 25.24 
Padova Sud 315.09 301.46 66.92 99.73 11.01 
Avellino 451.24 430.22 66.55 143.89 20.87 
Messina P 370.61 352.93 66.43 118.48 7.82 
Enna 338.18 320.24 65.83 109.41 6.90 
Napoli 2 404.79 374.83 63.44 137.02 44.63 
Trapani P N 342.74 317.74 63.57 115.75 17.42 
Genova 367.23 339.77 63.36 124.50 56.14 
Caserta 383.97 354.36 63.08 130.82 55.74 
Emilia Romagna 266.70 245.96 63.01 90.98 253.43 
Savona 304.64 279.43 62.42 105.02 18.41 
Ragusa 362.98 333.48 62.59 124.75 17.08 
Brindisi 357.58 327.07 62.11 123.93 22.73 
Foggia 351.42 319.95 61.60 122.85 33.00 
Trapani P S 323.42 294.34 61.56 113.15 7.01 
Lecce 345.85 314.40 61.43 121.25 46.09 
Umbria 349.08 312.42 59.70 125.89 58.90 
Catania P S 371.10 331.99 59.66 133.94 6.84 
Toscana Centro 322.41 286.45 58.88 117.78 108.25 
Palermo area M 384.66 337.00 57.30 143.91 65.33 
Palermo P O 441.51 381.18 55.61 169.20 8.88 
Sardegna 377.65 328.49 56.48 142.98 104.02 
Roma 406.26 349.80 55.30 156.37 376.37 
Toscana Costa 339.42 285.23 52.44 135.66 106.31 
Agrigento P E 350.81 289.89 50.43 143.71 22.28 
Taranto 310.98 250.77 47.43 131.84 38.70 
Caltanissetta P N 306.46 245.97 46.85 130.74 8.27 
Siracusa 349.61 276.30 44.91 152.22 29.16 
Catania P N 386.41 301.79 43.40 170.81 17.09 
La Spezia 379.71 295.84 43.09 168.37 20.49 
Imperia 370.70 287.81 42.64 165.09 21.65 
Venezia 347.99 270.00 42.55 155.10 75.44 
Toscana S 342.02 261.98 40.89 154.87 74.68 
Palermo P E 550.47 404.16 35.24 261.75 12.15 
Source: own elaboration 
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Table 4: Potential savings 
Threshold OTAs per option T 1 T 2 T 3 T 4 T 5 
Total saving 
(€bn) 
Potential savings 
under hypothesis 1. 
Operators attaining 
a performance ≥  
75% of the top 
performant 
Opt for price cap 50 40 29 16 11 
1.21 
Opt for parametric 33 43 54 67 72 
Annual savings 
(€m) 246 326 271 225 139 
Potential savings 
under hypothesis 1. 
Operators attaining 
a performance ≥  
85% of the top 
performant 
Opt for price cap 70 63 51 40 29 
1.68 
Opt for Parametric 13 20 32 43 54 
Annual savings 
(€m) 410 396 357 286 235 
Potential savings 
under hypothesis 1. 
Operators attaining 
a performance ≥  
95% of the top 
performant 
Opt for price cap 79 76 74 66 56 
1.96 
Opt for Parametric 4 7 9 17 27 
Annual savings 
(€m) 485 444 386 349 301 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
